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Introduction
A growing body of evidence shows that cognitive processes in general, and causal cognition in
particular, are variable across cultures (Choi et al., 1999; Norenzayan and Heine, 2005; Henrich
et al., 2010). The majority of these findings are based on cross-cultural comparisons contrasting
well-defined groups, with little explicit consideration of temporal change within those groups.
While this strategy has undoubtedly proven successful, an important limitation is that it can
implicitly lead to a view of cultures as stable entities and associated cognitive processes as
essentialized.
A prosaic illustration serves to introduce this idea. Suppose we hypothesize that smoking
cigarettes and culture are closely related. We measure the number of cigarettes per capita and find
that Chinese smoke more than Americans (Ng et al., 2014). If we collect time-series data, however,
we might notice that had our measurements been taken in 2000, we would have found no cultural
difference. Further, if our time-series had gone even further back to measurements taken in the
1980s, we would have found just the opposite pattern, such that Americans smoked more than the
Chinese. Clearly, findings for cultural differences are of limited utility when they do not account for
within-culture historical trends. Furthermore, theoretical explanations for cultural difference risk
reifying an incomplete perspective if they take such results as indicative of some atemporal notion
of “culture” itself.
In this paper we argue for the need to developmethods of within-culture diachronic analysis as a
necessary step for understanding the complex links between culture and cognition. We specifically
focus on the link between culture and causal cognition, yet the argument is applicable to the field
as a whole.
A Brief History of Cultural Causal Cognition
Seminal work in culture and cognition focused on comparisons between Easterners (mainly
Chinese, Japanese and South Koreans) and Westerners (mainly North Americans and
Western Europeans).1Using this East-West framework as the comparative lens, researchers
found that Easterners use a holistic mode of thinking while Westerners use an analytic
mode. Holistic thinking relies less on formal rules, attends to the whole field, and is
more open to dialectic contradiction than analytic thinking (Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett
and Miyamoto, 2005). In terms of causality, holistic thinkers are more likely to attend to
external forces and group patterns over internal dispositions (Morris and Peng, 1994); less
likely to use decontextualized information when making inferences (Norenzayan et al., 2002);
1For some notable exceptions see Barrett et al. (2005), Beller et al. (2009), Abarbanell and Hauser (2010), and Bender and
Beller (2011).
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consider a larger number of possible causes (Choi et al., 2003); are
more sensitive to covariance and perceive stronger associations
between events (Ji et al., 2000); are more likely to expect
change from prior trends (Ji et al., 2001); and tend to see
causes as extending further in a system (Maddux and Yuki,
2006).
In a move that proved remarkably generative, researchers
theorized that contemporary East-West cognitive differences
reflected epistemological orientations that could be traced back
to Ancient Chinese and Greeks. Much like contemporary Eastern
individuals, ancient Chinese philosophers were interested in
continuity, changes, transformations, and dependence between
objects, while Greek philosophers were interested in universal
truths, formal rules, and discrete objects and entities. Further,
ancient Chinese were interested in technological advances
driven by pragmatic goals, while the Greeks valued intellectual
endeavor for its own sake and were less concerned with
concrete applications of knowledge (Norenzayan and Nisbett,
2000; Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett, 2003). Such parallels
between historical philosophies and contemporary cognitive
patterns subsequently informed a major line of comparative
research.
This historical explanation assumes considerable
psychological continuity within cultures across time. Yet
accumulating evidence has begun to challenge the strong claim
that contemporary cultural differences are rooted in ancient
East-West philosophies (Varnum et al., 2010). First, when a
group changes its environment, it may start to resemble other
groups in similar environments rather than their original
ancestors. Kitayama et al. (2006), for example, showed that
settlers in Hokkaido in northern Japan were more individualistic
and made more dispositional causal inferences than people from
mainland Japan. The authors suggested that the Hokkaido’s
hostile environment fostered a “frontier spirit” similar to the
spirit of North American settlers from 19th century. Second,
within-culture differences in analytic and holistic processing
closely mimic the original East-West distinction. Within the
U.S., Na et al. (2010) found that working class Americans were
more holistic and less analytic than middle class Americans. At
minimum, this suggests that variation in cognitive orientations
is not unique to East-West cultural differences. Third, cultures
that share little with ancient Chinese in terms of epistemological
frameworks are still found to share many features of a holistic
cognitive style. Russians, for example, are historically closer
to the Greek intellectual tradition but are holistic in terms of
categorization, causal attribution, and reasoning about change
(Grossmann, 2009, cited in Varnum et al., 2010). At minimum,
these findings show that variation in holistic vs. analytic cognitive
orientations are not unique to historical East-West cultural
differences.
If cognitive orientations also vary within cultures that share
a single Ancient tradition, then this points to shifting cognitive
patterns across time. On this perspective, a fuller account of the
links between culture and cognition can be realized by including
within-culture comparisons aimed at mapping historical
trends.
Diachronic Approaches to Cultural
Cognition
Adding an explicit diachronic dimension to current work
on culture and cognition raises many methodological and
theoretical questions. Methodologically, the main challenge
facing researchers interested in within-culture historical trends
is the lack of longitudinal data. Part of the problem is that
cognitive psychologists, especially those working on causality,
often pursue very specific theoretical questions and rarely use
standardized measures or common procedures. Other fields are
in a more advantageous position, having collected continuous
time-series data long enough to detect trends. One widely
debated example comes from research on general intelligence
(Teasdale and Owen, 2005; Flynn, 2007), where scientists have
detected a stable increase during the last century (Flynn, 1984,
1987). Similarly, social psychologists working in the U.S. have
detected increases in self-esteem (Twenge and Campbell, 2001)
and decreases in conformity (Perrin and Spencer, 1981; Bond and
Smith, 1996), need for social approval (Twenge and Im, 2007)
and trust (Putnam, 1995; Robinson and Jackson, 2001) over the
last half century. Over the same relatively short period, clinical
psychologists have observed reliable increases in depression and
other psychopathologies (Twenge et al., 2010) and decreased
empathy and perspective taking (Konrath et al., 2011). In short,
data from standardized intelligence tests, personality measures,
and laboratory experiments suggest that Americans are changing
on some major psychological variables.
Unfortunately, comparable data is not readily available to
investigate similar shifts in cognitive dimensions. Longitudinal
designs are rare among cognitive psychologists, but there are
some documented cases of within-culture cognitive change. For
example, in 1969/70 Patricia Greenfield brought a complex
weaving task to Maya children and young adults in Mexico.
Twenty years later she revisited the community and ran the
same task with the same age groups (Greenfield et al., 2003).
As compared to the earlier sample, the new participants
demonstrated more abstract thinking and greater propensity for
novelty.
Another example comes from work on cognitive models
of the environment and folkbiological reasoning with several
cultural groups in the Peten rainforest in Guatemala (Medin and
Atran, 2004). In the 1990s, the indigenous Itza’ Maya dwellers
demonstrated elaborate knowledge of plant-animal interactions
within a belief system oriented toward ecological centrality
(Atran et al., 1999). In a second round of data collection about
a decade later, researchers found that the younger generation of
Itza’ Maya had less folkbiological expertise than their parents, and
that Itza’ Maya values had shifted away from ecological centrality
and toward monetary incentives (Le Guen et al., 2013).
Such examples of research documenting cognitive changes
within a culture are rare, because there is no systematic
longitudinal data for the vast majority of cognitive tasks
(Greenfield et al., 2003, p. 456). Moreover, both aforementioned
studies covered relatively short time periods where cognitive
changes were attributed to abrupt socio-economic shifts within
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local communities. Exploring other, more gradual, forms of
cultural change may require data from longer time periods
to detect reliable cohort differences. Unfortunately, identical
cognitive tasks are rarely used across studies, and when they
are, the two measurements are rarely distant enough in time for
longitudinal analysis.
Given this dearth of data, it becomes important to consider
alternative approaches. Are there methods that can yield proxy
measures of psychological variables when direct measurements
are not available? The answer to such a question is limited
only by the creativity of the researchers. One approach is to
analyze ethnographic reports from different time periods and
to draw inferences about a particular cultural group based on
the descriptions. In one such analysis, Widlok (2014) scrutinized
ethnographic accounts to provide evidence for cultural systems
of causal cognition observed across many decades. Another
promising method comes from analysis of cultural products,
such as magazines, advertisements, websites and news coverage
(see Morling and Lamoreaux, 2008). For more distant periods
where ethnographic description is unavailable, a researchermight
analyze extant artifacts such as tools, for example, and offer some
hypotheses about how previous humans represented causality
and reasoned about agency, goals and cause-effect relation
(Haidle, 2014; see also Alberti and Bray, 2009).
More recently, automatic text analysis has extended classical
anthropological and archeological methods to infer psychological
variables. Various methods of automated text analysis are now
in use by psychologists (Iliev et al., 2015). In dictionary-
based methods, which are the most straightforward to apply,
researchers assemble a set of words related to a particular
variable of interest. For example, positive affect in a text
might be measured by constructing a dictionary of terms such
as “happiness,” “joy,” “cheerful,” “optimism,” etc. The relative
frequency of target words across texts can then be used to
test hypotheses about positive affect associated with different
texts across time, for instance. While researchers can assemble
their own dictionaries, many social scientists have begun using
a dedicated software application called LIWC (Pennebaker
et al., 2001), which consists of multiple categories oriented
around general topics such as social processes, affect, cognition,
perception, and grammatical features of language.
Automated text analysis can be particularly useful for
detecting historical trends in large corpora. One compelling
demonstration comes from a study by Wolff et al. (1999),
who were interested in probing why contemporary U.S. college
students do poorly in folk-biological tasks. The authors assessed
the temporal dynamics of folk-biological knowledge encoded in
common English using a digitized historical dictionary of the
English language. The key finding was that cultural conceptual
knowledge about trees evolved from the 16th to 19th century,
but sharply declined during the 20th century. This analysis was
limited to dictionary entries, but researchers can now explore
a wider range of texts with the time-stamped ngram corpora
from Google (Michel et al., 2011), making historical comparisons
easier to implement and more precise in detecting year-to-year
changes. The ngram database is featured in Greenfield’s (2013)
study of cultural change in American and British values during
the last two centuries, where she found a stable decline of
words related to duties, obligations and belonging, accompanied
by increases in words related to individualism, choice, and
materialistic values.
Applying automated text analysis to study historical trends
in causal cognitive processes may be more challenging than
studying changes in knowledge content or social values, which
seem more amenable to direct analysis via word frequencies.
Still, some applications might be straightforward. For example,
LIWC offers a causality-focused dictionary that could be used
to measure cultural shifts in the frequency of causal language.
Cognitive psychologists interested in historical trends can also
develop specialized dictionaries guided by particular cognitive
theories. Such an approach was used by Dehghani et al. (2013)
to compare cultural epistemologies in Native American and
majority-culture American children’s books. This strategy is
particularly useful when the objective is to distinguish between
multiple cultural views on causality, rather than studying causal
thinking as a unitary construct.
Conclusion
The field of cultural cognition traces its foundations to scholars
who treated culture and history as complementary constructs
(Vygotsky, 1978). Yet most subsequent empirical work in the
field has been focused on cross-cultural comparisons alone,
rather than diachronic analysis within cultures. Accounting for
historical trends in cultural cognition will not only demand new
methodological developments, but will also press us to apply a
more dynamic concept of culture (see Brumann, 1999; ojalehto
and Medin, 2015). Theoretically, researchers are challenged to
consider whether “culture” is as much a temporally as it is a
spatially (and politically, economically, linguistically) bounded
construct. Treating culture as a dynamic system of social,
ecological, economic, institutional and psychological factors will
complicate our task, but it will also bring new insights and deeper
understanding of the complex interaction between culture and
cognition.
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